Michigan Law Review
Volume 65

Issue 7

1967

The Uniform Commercial Code Comes of Age
Roy L. Steinheimer Jr.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Roy L. Steinheimer Jr., The Uniform Commercial Code Comes of Age, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1275 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol65/iss7/2

This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Symposium: Selected Problems Under the
Uniform Commercial Code

FOREWORD
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMES OF AGE
Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr.*

I
upon a time back in the elegant and well-ordered Victorian
age, a new organization known as the National Conference of
State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Legislation in the United States undertook the task of drafting a Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) for adoption by the legislatures of the
various states. The law was finally prepared and recommended by the
Commissioners for adoption in 1896, and, by December of 1900, :fifteen states had adopted it. In that month, Dean Ames, of the Harvard
Law School, loosed a blast at this new law in an article in the

O

NCE

Harvard Law Review.1
Codification is with us a new art, and it is not surprising, although
it is unfortunate, that the commissioners did not realize, as continental codifiers realize, the extreme importance of the widest possible publication of the proposed code, and the necessity of abundant criticism, especially of public criticism, from practising lawyers
and judges, professors and writers, merchants and bankers. It is
far from an agreeable task to offer criticisms at this late hour.t Nor
would the following criticisms be offered now but for the writer's
conviction that the Negotiable Instruments Law ought not to be
enacted by any state which has not yet acted in the matter, unless
changed in important respects, and that those states in which it
has been adopted should remedy its defects by supplemental legislation.2
Dean Ames then proceeded to a detailed criticism of various sections
of the NIL, with more or less telling effect, and concluded that "its
adoption by fifteen states must be regarded as a misfortune, and its
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1937, University of Kansas; J.D.
1940, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 38, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
I. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REv. 241-42 (1900).
t [Footnote by Dean Ames) "The writer, although interested in the subject of Bills
and Notes both as an author and a teacher, saw the Negotiable Instruments Law for
the first time after its enactment by four state legislatures."
2. Id. at 241.
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enactment in additional states, without considerable amendment,
should be an impossibility.''3
Dean Ames' blows had found their mark. Judge Brewster, President of the group which by this time was known as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, felt it necessary to answer his criticisms in an article published in the Yale Law
Journal. 4 The merits of this answer were somewhat obscured by its
obviously condescending tone. After reporting that a subcommittee
of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had
discussed the NIL with Dean Ames and had concluded that no change
in the act was necessitated by his criticisms, Judge Brewster continued
with these comments:
It is with diffidence that I undertake to reply to legal criticisms
from such a source and upon such a subject. The Dean of the
Harvard Law School has so long been, not merely an expert, but an
authority, on this subject, that I would not rashly volunteer to attack
his positions. But, sometimes the point of view is quite as important
as extensive knowledge and I am constrained to believe that so keen
a controversialist is somewhat affected by the "gaudium certaminis"
which the most open-minded advocate cannot wholly resist. Then
too, if it is a question of experts, nearly all of them disagree with the
Dean, on the main points at issue, as I shall try to show. If it is a
question largely of practice and experience as a trier of cases, Professor Am.es has none-while on the other hand, on all questions of
custom and convenience, the practical knowledge of the hundred
lawyers, and more, who framed the Negotiable Instruments Law, and
the hundred bankers who adopted it, would seem to quite offset the
mere conclusions of erudition.
One who, like Professor Ames, can approach the consideration
of a legal subject from the purely academic point of view, unembarrassed by any preconceptions derived from practice at the bar, has
a certain advantage in that the matter may present itself to his view
in scientific arrangement and symmetry from the first. Yet on the
other hand, the want of just that everyday familiarity with commercial affairs and business men, which every lawyer in considerable
practice necessarily acquires, sometimes unfits the mere scholar or
book lawyer to see things as others see them, and may make him
give undue weight to what is really of little or no importance. Accustomed to deal only with theoretical questions and to measure law
by ideal standards, such a man may demand a fulness of expression
which amounts to prolixity, and discern obscurities where to the
ordinary lawyer or merchant everything would seem plain and
simple.5
3. Id. at 257.
4. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901).
5. Id. at 84-85.
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The first blows having been struck by the antagonists, the controversy continued through a replication by Dean Ames6 and a rejoinder
by Judge Brewster,7 both of which seemed to generate more heat
than light. Dean Ames, in the course of his replication, did, however,
demonstrate his ability to punch his way out of a corner rather
adeptly. Caught by Judge Brewster in an inconsistency between
statements made in his earlier writings and what he had said in his
criticism of the NIL, Dean Ames extricated himself by admitting the
"youthful indiscretion" of his earlier statements. However, he went
on to point out that, even in his callow days, he would not have gone
as far as the NIL had and concluded by thanking Judge Brewster for
reminding him of an additional objection to the NIL. 8 Once more
Dean Ames was on the offensive and carrying the fight to his opponent.
In Judge Brewster's rejoinder, his earlier air of condescension
had changed to one of obvious irritation and impatience with his
adversary, as evidenced by this rather unique argument:
The eleven subsections taken, most of them word for word, from
the English Bills of Exchange Act, and all so identical therewith
that the critic's [Dean Ames'] objections apply to the acts equally,
need no justification at this late date. They have been the satisfactory law of England and her colonies for twenty years. On them
criticism is barred by the natural statute of limitations and the
universal approval of the commercial world. One might as well
criticise the Bill of Rights or the Lord Chancellor's Wig. 9

Fortunately at this stage of the controversy an obscure, dispassionate, and wise individual-Mr. Charles L. McKeehan, Lecturer
on Bills and Notes in the Law Department of the University of
Pennsylvania-courageously stepped between the "arm-weary" antagonists. In his self-appointed role as referee, he stopped the fight
and quickly proceeded to shed more light on the merits of the controversy than had either of the principal antagonists. 10 Meanwhile our
6. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A. Word More, 14 HARV. L. REv. 442
(1901).
7. Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A. Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15
HARv. L. REv. 26 (1901).
8. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A. Word More, 14 HARv. L. REv. 442, 44647 (1901).
9. Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames, I5
HARV. L. REv. 26 (1901). At another point, Judge Brewster swung wildly in this fashion:
"It is the Dean against the world. Therefore so much the worse for the world. This
eccentric heresy of the Professor makes his illustrations ••• utterly meaningless." Id.
at 32.
10. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (.tl. Review of the A.mes-Brewster
Controversy), 50 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 499, 561 (1902).

1278

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1275

statute, the NIL, unsullied by Dean Ames' proposed amendments,
was adopted by the legislatures of all of our states and lived happily
almost forever after.

II
This little episode in legal history stirred the emotions of academicians and set a "style among law teachers for the next forty
years"11 and beyond. The style was never more evident than with
the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code).12 The output
of written material dealing with the Code has been prodigious,13
and, as would be expected, has often pointed to flaws in the statute.
Most of these suggested flaws could best be described, in the words
of Judge Brewster, as "like spots on the sun. It takes an expert to
see them, and he must use glasses at that."14 On the other hand, some
of the defects, in the words of Dean Ames, "must inevitably be followed, sooner or later, by additional legislation to remedy the evils
which they ... introduce." 15
Whatever its flaws, it seems that the Code has finally come of age.
During what might be called its adolescence-the decade from
1952 to 1962-the Code was the subject of constant, critical examination by all interested segments of the business, professional, and
academic community. Numerous amendments to the Code were
made; some were important; some were more politic than vital. It
was evident that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had taken to heart Dean Ames' admonitions regarding proper codification procedures. It is doubtful that the good
Dean, even in his fondest dreams, could have envisioned the publicity which has attended the development of the Code. By 1962, the
Code had been adopted in eighteen states but was effective in only
eleven states and had been effective in only two of those eleven states
for a period of more than two years. At this writing, the Code has
been adopted in forty-nine of our fifty states16 and this almost unanimous acceptance demonstrates the over-all merits of this magnificent
11. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 79 (7th ed. Beutel 1948).
12. For an example of the classic pattern, see Beutel, Proposed Uniform [1] Com•
mercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952), and Gilmore, Uniform
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952).
13. A quick check indicates that, from 1950 to date, there have been at least forty
symposia and 300 leading articles published about the Uniform Commercial Code. In
addition, there are more than 150 student notes and comments.
14. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84, 97
(1901).
15. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word More, 14 HARv. L. REV. 442,
449 (1901).
16. Louisiana, with its civil law background, is the lone holdout.
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statute. But the fact remains that the Code has been in effect and
operation in only five of these states for a period of more than five
years. At this point, therefore, the Code deserves the opportunity to
prove itself in the rough and tumble of the market place for a decent
period of time. The time for instant amendment of the Code on the
basis of endless hypotheticals has passed. The words of Mr. McKeehan
uttered in connection with the Ames-Brewster controversy seem to
be appropriate:
It is easy to lose one's perspective and sense of proportion in such a
matter. The flaws in the act, few though they be, when grouped
together and considered alone, seem formidable. Yet, when a survey
is made of the entire statute, when one regards the many salutary
provisions which settle disputed questions or introduce needed
changes, when one studies the admirable simplicity and accuracy
of most of its provisions and considers the comparative unimporta,;ice of most of the flaws which have been discovered, then the
shortcomings of the [act] ... shrink to their real size and (though
still apparent) do not seem likely to seriously impair its usefulness.
. . . [T]he act having been started on its course and legislatively
adopted in a number of states before these errors were discovered, it
was decided, and no doubt wisely decided that it was unnecessary
and impolitic to start the work of amendment at that stage of its
career. The readiness of several state legislatures to adopt the act
in spite of the criticisms that have been made upon it and the very
small amount of litigation that has arisen under it in jurisdictions
where it has been in force for several years, have thus far vindicated
the soundness of the Commissioners' decision.17

At this juncture, the real value of the wealth of written material
on the Code, including the excellent articles in this symposium, lies
not in triggering instant amendment of the Code, but rather in focusing the attention of judges and lawyers on potential problems under
the Code so that such persons will be better able to handle these
problems properly if and when they arise. This complex statute will
never be flawless, but constant tinkering could well do more harm
than good. Most of the defects so far discovered can certainly be
handled by intelligent interpretation of the statute as it now stands.18
17. McKeehan, supra note 10, at 589-90.
18. Again the observations of Mr. McKeeban in connection with Ames-Brewster

controversy are apropos:
Professor Ames has rendered substantial service to the Negotiable Instruments
Law. He has pointed out the difficulties and possible dangers that lurk in some
sections of it, and a careful study of his criticisms by those courts which will be
called on from time to time to construe these sections, will serve to avoid some
confusion and several unfortunate decisions. After all, many, if not most, of the
flaws in the act can be overcome by a careful interpretation.
Id. at 590.
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All of this is not to say that the Code should be abandoned to
the stresses of the market place for the next half century, as was the
NIL. Orderly review of the Code's effectiveness in operation is called
for. Changing technology may necessitate eventual revision of the
provisions dealing with commercial paper, bank collections, and investment securities; the experiment in codification of principles and
practices relating to letters of credit should be closely watched; and
the secured transactions provisions should be the subject of longrange review in light of developments in the market place.
It is the announced intention of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide this kind of surveillance of the Code and a Permanent Editorial Board has been established for this purpose. Unfortunately, the operations of this Board
to date have been haphazard and disappointing. If the Board is to
accomplish its objectives over the long pull, it will be necessary to
structure its operations more carefully. Orderly procedures for ongoing study of the Code and for periodic overhaul of the statute must
be established and given appropriate publicity.19 If the work of this
Board is properly organized and executed, hip-shooting legislators
will hopefully be discouraged from riddling the Code with ill-considered and non-uniform amendments.
19. Perhaps the recent establishment of the special Article Nine Review Committee
is a step in the right direction.

